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NOTES
the wrong that would have gone unremedied had the common law been
followed, the court heeded the dictates of common sense as well as basic
morality. In the language of the court, a rule of law carried to its extreme
conclusion is often extreme injustice.
RICHARD L. LEEDY

PREFERRED'S RIGHT To

SURPLUS IN

ABSENCE OF AN ExPREss

LIQUIDATION PROVISION

Priorities as between classes of stock are creatures of contract.' If one
class of stock has a priority to dividends over another class of stock, it is
commonly referred to as "preferred stock". Preferred stock can, by express
provision, be given a priority as to return of the capital investment on
dissolution. It quite often is also preferred on dissolution to an amount
equal to the unpaid and accrued dividends. The articles of incorporation
may state or deny many other priorities or rights to preferred stock.
In the absence of an express provision in the articles of incorporation,
creating a priority or right for preferred stock on dissolution, several problems can arise. It has been generally accepted that if on dissolution
capital remains to be distributed, the so-called "equality rule" is applied
in the absence of an express provision for capital distribution on dissolution. 2 Under the "equality rule" all classes of stock share in the distribution in proportion to their investment. However, if on dissolution, after
payment of the corporate debts, and after return of the capital investment
to all classes of stock, assets remain to be distributed, the question arises
as to the respective rights of each class of stock to such surplus in the
absence of an express provision covering surplus distribution on dissolution.
Four variations of this problem can arise:
FACT SITUATION NUMBER 1:
a) Preferred has a prority as to dividends, but none accrued or unpaid.
b) Preferred has a liquidation preference as to capital, but there is no
provision for the distribution of surplus on dissolution.
c) Assets to be distributed on dissolution, after payment of debts, are
greater than capital, therefore surplus remains to be distributed as well
as capital.
1.

2.

Hamlin v. Toledo, St. L. & K.C. R. Co., 78 Fed. 664, 36 L.R.A. 826 (6th Cir. 1897);'
Lloyd v Pennsylvania Electric Vehicle Co., 75 N.J. Eq. 263, 72 At. 16, 21 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 228, 138 Am. St. Rep. 557, 20 Ann Cas. 119 (1909); Williams v. Renshaw,
220 App. Div. 39, 220 N.Y.S. 532 (1927); Drewry, Hughes Co. v. Throckmorton,
120 Va. 859, 92 S.E. 818 (1917). See also I COOK ON CORPORATIONS sec. 269
7th ed. 1913); 11 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS sec. 5295 (per.
ed. 1932); and 1 MACHEM sec. 525 (1st ed. 1908).
Guaranty Trust Co. v. Galveston City R. Co., 107 Fed. 311 (5th Cir. 1901); Teller
v. Wilcoxen, 1 10 Iowa 565, 81 N.W. 772 (1900); Coltrane v. Baltimore, etc. Assoc.,
110 Fed. 281 (1901); People v. New York, etc., Co., 50 N.Y. Misc. Rep. 23 (1906).
See also 5 THOMPSON ON CORPORATIONS sec. 6590 (2d ed. 1910); 1 COOK ON
CORPORATIONS sec. 278 (7th ed. 1913); 1 MACHEN, MODERN LAW OF
CORPORATIONS sec. 564 (1st ed. 1908).
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FACT SITUATION NUMBER 2:
a) No accured or unpaid dividends.
b) No liquidation provision for either capital or surplus.
c) Surplus.
FACT SITUATION NUMBER 3:
a) Dividends accrued and unpaid.
b) Liquidation provision only as to capital.
c) Surplus.
FACT SITUATION NUMBER 4:
a) Dividends accrued and unpaid.
b) No liquidation provision for either capital or surplus.
c) Surplus.
In situation number 1 the English courts have recently adopted the
"exhaustion rule", which is merely a restatement of the canon of construction: expressio unius est exclusio alterius.3 Under this rule an
expression in the articles of incorporation of one liquidation right of
priority (such as to return of capital investment) excludes or exhausts
the possibility of any other participation on dissolution (such as to surplus).
This rule was approved by the House of Lords as the proper rule for fact
situation number 1 in the 1949 case of Scottish Insurance Corporation v.
Wilsons & Clyde.4 Prior to this case and since 1932 the "equality rule",
as set out in In re William Metcalfe,5 had been applied to fact situation
number 1. It was held in the Metcalfe case that:
when there are surplus assets left over they are to be dealt
with as between the members on the basis of equality, whatever
were the original and limited rights of the preference shareholders earlier."08
The Metcalfe case, however, was expressly overruled by the Scottish Insurance case. Which of these two rules is the more desirable solution for
situation number I will be later discussed, but the important fact to note
is that the "exhaustion rule" is the law of England today for fact situation
number 1.
The American authority on fact situation number 1 is weak but seemingly in line with the present English view. Only two cases are to be found:
a New York decision, Williams v. Renshaw,? and a Missouri case, Murphy
v. Richardson Dry Goods Co.8 In the Williams case the the majority of
the court construed what seemed to be an ambiguous dissolution provision
to be preference only as to par return. The court then went on to say:
Scottish Insurance Corporation v. Wilsons & Clyde, 1949 A.C. 462. In re Isle of
Thanet Electricity Supply Co., Ltd., 1949 2 All E. R. 1060, 1950 Ch. 161.
4. 1949 A.C. 462.
5. 1933 Ch. 142.
6. Id. at 155.
7. 220 App. Div. 59, 220 N.Y.S. 532 (1927).
8. 326 Mo. 1, 31 S.W.2d 72 (1930).
3.
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"The language in the instant case provides for the 'winding up'
and specifies the amount to be received. This is exclusive of other
amounts."9 (Italics supplied)
The Murphy case was decided along much the same line of reasoning
and cites the Williams case with approval. However, whether either of
these cases is authority, even in its own jurisdiction, for the proposition that
the "exhaustion rule" should be applied to fact situation number 1, is
open to question. There is language in the Williams case to suggest that
the holding, as set out above, was based on an implied restriction in the
preferred share contract, rather than by applying the "exhaustion rule"
to an express liquidation provision:
"When the second preferred stock is paid at 'par', it no longer
exists. It is automatically eliminated. . . . The meaning to be
ascribed to such language is that second preferred stockholders
should be paid 'in full' and that 'payment in full' means that they
should receive payment 'at par', and that payment made to them,
when made at par' shall be in full. This conclusion eliminates
necessity of discussion of the English authorities cited by the
appellant ... "10
Whether such language is sufficient to distinguish the Williams case and
the Murphy case from any application of the "exhaustion rule", is open
to question. However, both of these cases cite with approval the English
case of In re National Telephone Co. in which it was held that:
"... attachment of preferential rights to preferential shares on
their creation, is, primae facie, a definition of the whole of their
rights . . . and negatives any further or other right. . .. "I'
This approach certanly would indicate that the New York courts and the
Missouri courts are inclined toward the application of the "exhaustion
rule" to fact situations where there is a provision for return of capital, but
no provision for the distribution of surplus on dissolution. Added authority
for the "exhaustion rule" might also be found in the dictum of an Ohio
case which indicated that one provision for liquidation might exclude an
implication of any other.1 2
In situation number 2, where there are no unpaid dividends and no
provision for distribution of either surplus or capital, both the American
and English case law is extremely weak In the American case of Continental Insurance Co. v. Reading Co.,13 the court held that preferred and
common should share equally in the distribution of assets on dissolution.
The court based its decision upon construction of the articles of incorpora.
tion, but went on to say:
"it (meaning their construction of the articles) is, however,
9.
10.
11.
12.

Supra note 7, at 536.
Ibid.
1914 1 Ch. 755, 774.
Hatch v. Newark Telephone Co., 34 Ohio App. 361, 3,76, 170 N.E. 371. 376 (1930).

13.

259 US. 156, 42 S. Ct. 540 (I=2).
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in accord with the general common law rule that stockholders,
common and preferred, share alike in the assets of a liquidating
corporation, if the preference is only as to divididends." 4 (Italics
supplied)
Thus it would seem that situation number 2 is covered by the "equality
rule". However, the rule as set out in the Continental opinion does not
state whether all the assets of a dissolving corporation are distributed by
the "equality rule" or just the assets representing capital. An analysis of
the cases cited supporting the so-called "common law rule" seems to
indicate that the "rule" is limited to capital distributions. Two of the cases
cited make such a distinction, Lloyd v. Pennsylvania Electric Vehicle Company15 and Birch v. Cropper.1 6 In the Lloyd case no surplus actually
existed and the funds being distributed on dissolution actually represented
return of the capital investment; however, the court, by way of dictum,
approved Birch v. Cropper and the application of the "equality rule" to
fact situation number 2, where there is no liquidation provision whatsoever.17 Birch v. Cropper,an early English case, held that assets representing
surplus and due to the sale of assets pursuant to dissolution are to be
"distributed among the shareholders in proportion to their shares."1 8 Thus,
by the Lloyd case's approval of the English case, it might be said that this
dictum is some authority in the United States in support of the "equality
rule". Further authority favoring the application of the equality rule to
situation number 2 might be found in Williams v. Renshaw, in which the
concurring opinion refers to the Continental case as "a case in which a
preference was confined to dividends only, and the court held that, in
distribution of capital assets, the two stocks stood equal."19 It would at
first appear that the use of the word "capital" in his quotation would
limit the rule of the Continentalcase to capital distributions, but by reading
on in the opinion of the Williams case it will be noted that the term
"capital assets" is used very loosely and probably would include surplus
distributions.
All that can be said for the case law concerning fact situation number 2
is that it is weak, ambiguous and consists mostly of dictum.
Situations number 3 and 4 present an interesting variation of situations
number 1 and 2. Here, to the lack of an express liquidation provision, is
added the additional problem of dividends being accrued and unpaid on
the preferential shares.
In situation number 3, where there is a liquidation provision as to
capital but not as to surplus, there seems to be no case law. It might be
14.

Id. at 548.

16.
17.

14 A.C. 525 (1889).
72 At. 16. 18 (N.1. 1909). See note 15, supra.

19.

Supra note 7, at 537.

15.

18.

75 N.T. En. 26.. '72 At. 16, 21 L.R.A. (N.S.)
Ann. Cas. 119 M).09).

SuDra note 16. at 548.

228, 138 Am. St. Rep. 557, 20
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presumed that the "exhaustion rule" should be applied here inasmuch
as it was applied to parallel situation number 1. It would follow here,
also, that an expression of one liquidation right would exclude any further
participation on liquidation.
Situation number 4 is parellel to situation number 2 in that there is
surplus to be distributed, but there is no liquidation provision in the
articles of incorporation to control either capital distribution or surplus
distribution. The variation between situation number 2 and situation
number 4 lies in the fact that in situation number 2 there are dividends
accrued and unpaid on the preferred stock. The question arises as to how
this additional fact affects the application of the "equality rule", which it
seems has had more favor with the law in situation number 2. The basic
philosophy of the "equality rule" is that a share of stock is the same as any
other share of stock unless there is an express provision taking away the
innate equality.2 0 Inasmuch as there is no express liquidation provision in
situation number 4, it would seem to follow that the "equality rule" would
require that all shares take rateably and thus, preferred would not take its
accrued dividend plus a proportionate share of the surplus, but would only
take a per cent of the surplus, based on total capital of both classes.
From the foregoing discussion of each fact situation it may be noted,
with the exception of situation number 1, that the law has not crystalized
into absolute rules. It must be remembered that the solutions set out above
in the discussion of fact situations number 2, 3, and 4 are in the most part
mere speculations and conjectures as to the rules some courts might be
inclined to follow, and that they are adopted mainly from dictums and
English cases. However, it is not because of the inadequacy of the case
law, but rather due to the unfairness of the rules that a court might follow,
that a more equitable theory of surplus distribution is here submitted.
Such a theory of surplus distribution might be evolved from a series
of English cases involving the dissolution of the Bridgewater Navigation
Company. In 1888, the first Bridgewater case was decided.2 1 The Court
of Appeal there applied the "equality rule" to surplus distribution and
the case was affirmed by the House of Lords in the case of Birch v. Cropper,22 in which the rule of equality was modified so that both classes of
stock shared in proportion to their capital investment. But in applying
the "equality rule", the court made an important distinction:
".... the assets of the company remaining undistributed other than
the reserve fund, which is not the subject of this application,
among the shareholders in proportion
ought to be distributed
23
to their shares."
20.
21.
22.
23.

1 MACHEN, MODERN LAW OF CORPORATIONS secs. 517-523 (1st ed. 1908).
1 COOK ON CORPORATIONS sec. 278 (7th ed. 1913).
39 Ch. 1 (1888).
14 A.C. 525 (1889).
Id. at 548.
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Thus, it must be noted that only a part of the surplus of the Bridgewater
Navigation Company was distributed by the 'equality rule". The remainder of the surplus, representing a reserve fund accumulated out of
withheld earnings, was adjudicated upon and distributed according to the
ruling of the third Bridgewater case, In re Bridgewater Navigation Co.,
decided in 1891 by the Court of Appeal:
".. . if it appears that some of those assets consist of undrawn
profits of one of these classes, such undrawn profits ought to be
distributed amongst the members of that class .... "24
Thus, it is submitted that the Bridgewater cases will support a general
theory of surplus distribution in absence of an express provision to the
effect that the "equality rule" is only applied to funds, other than capital,
if such funds would not have been available for distribution if the corporation were still a going concern; that if the surplus fund was such that it
could have been distributed as dividend just prior to dissolution, then such
funds should be distributed in dissolution according to the dividend scheme
set out in the articles. Birch v. Cropper supports the first part of this
general theory. There the surplus fund represented realized appreciation
of assets. Such surplus would not have been available for distribution
while the Bridgewater Navigation Co. was still a going concern because the
articles of this company limited payment of dividends only "out of the
profits of the company arising from the business".2 5 Thus, by analysis of
the source of the surplus fund it can be seen that at no time did either
common or preferred have a contingent claim against the surplus adjudicated in that case. However, the surplus fund considered in the third
Bridgewater case 26 did represent accumulated earnings and could have
been distributed as dividends just before dissolution. It was held that
since this surplus fund would have been available to the common stock
for dividends after payment of preferred's set rate, the mere fact that
dissolution had intervened did not change the fact that the surplus actually
belonged to the common shareholders and, therefore, should be distributed
to them on dissolution. This holding supports the second part of the
general theory set out above.
Whether this group of English cases would be authoritative, even in
England, is open to question. It has been over sixty years since the House
of Lords decided Birch v. Cropper. In a recent case before the House of
Lords the third Bridgewater case was criticized:
"I have to doubt that this was a correct decision, and there was
27
no appeal."
In the same case Lord Simonds inserted a possible protest against the
general theory evolved from the Bridgewater cases:
24.
25.
96.
27.

2 Ch. 317, 329 (1891).
Supra note 21, at 2.
See note 24, supra.
Supra note 4, at 482.
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"... the profits though undrawn, belong, subject to the payment
of the preference dividend, to the ordinary stockholders and in so
far as surplus assets are attributable to undrawn profits, the preference stockholders have no right to them. This appears to follow
from the decision of the Court of Appeal in In re Bridgewater
Navigation Company (1), in which the judgment of the House
of Lords in Birch v. Cropper (2) is worked out. This again is
not decisive of the construction of the particular articles, but 1 am
unwilling to suppose that the parties intended a bargain which
would involve an investigation of an artificial and elaborate
character into the nature and origin of the surplus assets."2s (Italics
supplied)
Thus, it would seem that the Bridgewater cases might be doubtful
authority in England today. However, this is not to say that the theory
of surplus disribution evolved from these cases is without support.2 9 A
dictum in an American case, Niles v. Ludlow Valve Mfg. Co.,3 0 might
be persuasive authority for such a theory. There the court was faced with
the problem of surplus distribution of a going concern in absence of an
express provision. The court based its reasoning on what rights preferred
would have on dissolution as to surplus. The court reasoned that if the
surplus were due to an unearned increment attaching to the corpus of the
corporation, the preferred might have an interest in the surplus: but if
the fund were due to accumulated annual profits, "such profits when and
as earned, belonged to the common shareholders (after paying 8 per cent
to the preferred), they did not cease so to belong by failure to pay them
out in annual dividends." 3' 1
The proposed theory for surplus distribution might be restated as
follows:
In absence of an express provision govering the distribution
of surplus on dissolution, such surplus should be distributed in
accordance with the dividend scheme if the surplus is such as
would have been available for dividend distribution if the concern had not gone into dissolution; but if the surplus fund would
not have been available for dividend distribution, then such
surplus should be distributed according to the "equality rule".
Applying this theory to the four fact situations set out above, it will be
noticed that the results in each situation will usually vary from the results
of the application of the rules it was believed that some courts might be
inclined to follow. Application of this theory, however, requires knowledge
of additional facts from those set out in each fact situation. It requires an
investigation of the source of the surplus and an examination of the
statutes and articles of incorporation for r.estrictions on declaration of
dividends.
28.

Supra note 4, at

29.

See 81 U. Pa. L. Rev. 875. also suggesting application of the theory set out in this
article.
196 Fed. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1912), affirmed in 202 Fed. 141 (2d Cir. 1913).
Id. at 996.

30.
31.

488.
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Thus, in situation number 1 the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio
alterius or the "exhaustion rule" has no application, since the capital will
be distributed according to the express provision of the articles and the
surplus will be distributed by the provisions governing dividends if such
surplus were available just before dissolution for dividend distribution;
and if the surplus were such that it would not have been available for
dividends if dissolution has not intervened, then it will be distributed
according to the "rule of equality".
In situation number 2, where there is no liquidation provision for
distribution of either capital or surplus, the "equality rule" is applied also,
only of the surplus fund would not have been available for dividends if
there had been no dissolution.
In fact situations number 3 and 4, the accrued dividends on the preferred shares would be paid on dissolution and common would be entitled
to the remainder, if the articles so provided and the surplus was derived
from a legal source for the declaration of dividends. If the surplus, however, was not such as would have been available for dividends, then the
"rule of equality" would be applied and the surplus fund would be
divided rateably among the classes of shares.
Although the direct authority for the surplus theory proposed in this
article is limited to the Bridgewater cases and the dictum of the Niles case,
the logic and the fairness of the rule should be convincing enough to
overcome the deficiency of authority. It should also be pointed out that
the direct authority for any other rule is also very limited and weak. Thus,
it is submitted that the theory of surplus distribution herein evolved should
be applied to all four fact situations. This results in a more fair and
equitable distribution on dissolution.
JAMES A. TILKER

